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More than one-third of the World Trade Organization-notified services trade
agreements that were in effect between January 2008 and August 2015 involved
at least one South or Southeast Asian trading partner. Drawing on Baier and
Bergstrand’s (2004) determinants of preferential trade agreements and using
the World Bank’s database on the restrictiveness of domestic services regimes
(Borchert, Gootiiz, and Mattoo 2012), we examine the potential for negotiated
regulatory convergence in Asian services markets. Our results suggest that Asian
economies with high levels of preexisting bilateral merchandise trade and wide
differences in services regulatory frameworks are more likely candidates for
services trade agreement formation. Such results lend support to the hypothesis
that the heightened “servicification” of production generates demand for the
lowered services input costs resulting from negotiated market openings.
Keywords: Asia, preferential trade agreements, regulation, regulatory
convergence, services trade
JEL codes: F10, F13, F15
I. Introduction
One of the striking features of trade diplomacy in recent years has been the
seemingly unstoppable march of preferential trade liberalization and rule-making
(Kawai and Wignajara 2010). Such a trend now extends to services, particularly
in the Asia-Pacific region (Chanda 2011, PECC and ADBI 2011, Shepherd and
Pasadilla 2012). Of the 81 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that entered in
force prior to January 2000, 73 (90%) featured provisions dealing exclusively with
trade in goods. Between January 2000 and August 2015, 124 of the 194 PTAs that
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entered into force also included provisions on services trade. The above trend signals
the heightened importance of services trade in general, the growing need among
economies to place such trade on a firmer institutional and rule-making footing,
and the attractiveness of doing so on an expedited basis via preferential negotiating
platforms (Sauve´ and Shingal 2011). Interestingly, more than one-third (28) of the
78 World Trade Organization (WTO)-notified services trade agreements (STAs) that
were in effect between January 2008 and August 2015 involved at least one South
or Southeast Asian trading partner.
Unlike trade in goods, where the removal of border barriers retains significant
negotiating traction, domestic regulation is the sole currency of negotiations in
services trade (Mattoo and Sauve´ 2010). The importance and potentially trade- and
investment-inhibiting impact of domestic regulation on service sector performance
has received significant attention in policy research circles (Kox and Norda˚s 2007,
2009). However, less well understood and investigated has been the question of
whether certain economies are more likely candidates for negotiated regulatory
convergence from a services trade perspective. Simply put, are economies that
display greater ex ante regulatory convergence more likely candidates for deeper
integration agreements in services markets? Is the demand for negotiated market
openings a by-product of what has been dubbed the “servicification” of production?1
What is the role of geography in trade-facilitating regulatory convergence in
services? Finally, can the presence of significant developmental or institutional
capacity gaps impede integration and convergence in services markets?
This paper seeks answers to the above questions in an Asian setting.2
According to the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Information System, 103
PTAs entered into force during January 2008–August 2015. A vast majority of
these (exceeding 70% of WTO-notified agreements) included provisions that cover
both goods and services trade. Twenty-eight of the 78 STAs notified over the same
period involved at least one Asian trading partner, and 11 of these have been entered
into with another partner from Asia. Clearly then, Asian economies have been at
the forefront of the burgeoning trend toward services preferentialism, offering a
potentially fertile setting for exploring this paper’s core research questions.
Regulatory heterogeneity has been shown to exert a significantly negative
impact on bilateral services trade via Mode 3 (commercial presence) (Kox and
Norda˚s 2009) and commercial presence is the most dominant mode of service
delivery, accounting for 55%–60% of all services trade flows (Maurer and
Magdeleine 2008). We would thus expect trading partners in a services accord
to exhibit lower levels of regulatory heterogeneity compared to those that are not
1For a fuller discussion of servicification, see National Board of Trade (2012).
2For the purpose of this paper, Asia comprises Bangladesh, Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand,
and Viet Nam. These are the economies for which information on services regulation is available in the World Bank’s
Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) database (Borchert, Gootiiz, and Mattoo 2012).
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party to such an agreement. Interestingly, this was not found to be true for the
Asian economies studied in this paper. The causal links actually run in the opposite
direction.
Regulatory approximation or convergence thus appears as one of the main
objectives of negotiated services agreements rather than its chief determinant:
the greater the extent of regulatory heterogeneity between trading partners, the
more likely are they to enter into a services agreement to promote trade- and
investment-facilitating regulatory convergence. Significantly, this proposition is
validated by the empirical analysis undertaken for our sample economies, also
lending support to the hypothesis that servicification trends—the heightened share
of services value added in final production—generate demands to lower the services
costs that may arise from regulatory heterogeneity.
II. Related Literature
Services preferentialism has spawned three strands of literature to date. A
first strand has investigated the trade effect of services accords on aggregate and
disaggregated services trade flows, using advanced estimation techniques from
the rapidly evolving gravity model empirical literature (Park 2002; Francois and
Hoekman 2010; Gru¨nfeld and Moxnes 2003; Kimura and Lee 2004; Lennon 2009;
Marchetti 2011; Shingal 2014a, 2014b; van der Marel and Shepherd 2013; Walsh
2006).3
A second strand has explored the impact that differing levels of (and
heterogeneity in) regulation exert on bilateral services trade flows (Francois,
Hoekman, and Woerz 2007; Fink 2009; Kox and Lejour 2006; Kox and Norda˚s
2007, 2009; Schwellnus 2007; van der Marel and Shepherd 2013). A third strand
has resorted to theoretical and empirical techniques to estimate barriers to trade
in services and foreign direct investment, and/or to provide estimates of services
trade costs (Francois, Hoekman, and Woerz 2007; Miroudot, Sauvage, and Shepherd
2012, 2013; van der Marel 2011).
The literature has also evolved to explain services commitments in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Roy 2011), those made reciprocally
(Marchetti, Roy, and Zoratto 2012), as well as GATS+ commitments in STAs (van
der Marel and Miroudot 2014).
The papers closest to ours include Baier and Bergstrand (2004), who were
the first to examine the determinants of partners’ propensities to negotiate PTAs,
and Cole and Guillin (2015) and Egger and Wamser (2013), who explored this issue
for services accords. The latter two papers, however, did not consider regulatory
convergence as a determinant for entering into negotiations. Studying the role of
3An elaboration of these techniques is beyond the scope of this paper but an excellent review is provided in
Head and Mayer (2014).
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regulatory convergence is thus the main contribution of this paper. This is done
through recourse to a new World Bank dataset on measures of services (regulatory)
restrictiveness (Borchert, Gootiiz, and Mattoo 2012).4
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found the potential welfare gains and likelihood
of a PTA in goods trade between a pair of economies to be higher
(i) the closer the two trading partners are in terms of geographic distance;
(ii) the more remote they are from the rest of the world (ROW);
(iii) the larger and more similar they are economically, in terms of real gross
domestic product (GDP), to enable exploitation of economies of scale in the
presence of differentiated products;
(iv) the greater the difference in relative factor endowments between them, leading
to Heckscher–Ohlin trade; and
(v) the smaller the difference in the relative factor endowment ratios relative to
those of the ROW, leading to less interindustry trade diversion.
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found these factors to have economically and
statistically significant effects on the probability of negotiating a goods agreement.
In comparison, Cole and Guillin (2015) examined a dyad’s propensity to
negotiate a services agreement, and in their baseline specification found statistically
significant evidence only for the natural trading partner hypothesis, similarity in
terms of economic size, and relative factor endowment differences—both those
emanating from Heckscher–Ohlin trade and those leading to less interindustry trade
diversion. Egger and Wamser (2013) found the determinants of goods and services
trade agreements to be similar.
III. Regulation in Services Trade
Regulatory measures affect cross-border trade and investment in services by
increasing both the fixed cost of entering a market and the variable cost of servicing
that market. Where regulation is destination specific, such costs can become sunk,
which makes the decision to export similar to an investment decision and involves
a self-selection process studied in the heterogeneous firm trade literature (Melitz
2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004; Bernard et al. 2007; Chaney 2008).
Essentially, only firms with the highest productivity and/or lowest marginal costs tend
4See the World Bank’s STRI database at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicetrade/home.htm
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Table 1. Comparison of STRI across Regions and Groups
Region or Group LAC ECA EAP OECD SSA SA MENA World
Mean 21.6 18.8 39.1 19.1 32.0 43.9 45.2 28.3
Standard deviation 10.0 6.7 13.9 4.8 16.6 13.7 11.2 14.9
EAP = East Asia and the Pacific, ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America
and the Caribbean, MENA = Middle East and North Africa, OECD = Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, SA = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa, STRI = Services
Trade Restrictiveness Index.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank STRI database.
to profitably overcome sunk market-entry costs, thereby self-selecting themselves
into becoming exporters.
In the context of an STA between trading partners, regulatory requirements
assume significance for firms in both markets and the objective of the agreement
is usually twofold: (i) to reduce the level and incidence of restrictive regulation
in both markets; and (ii) to promote convergence and approximation, including
through mutual recognition, and ultimately (but less frequently and successfully) to
harmonize regulatory practices between trading partners.
The measure of regulation in services markets used in this paper is the Services
Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) recently released by the World Bank. Compiled
from responses to questionnaires sent by the World Bank to 79 developing economies
on impediments to international integration, and from publicly available information
for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies,
STRI is a quantitative index of restrictions on services trade encompassing 103
economies, 5 major service sectors, and 19 subsectors. The information is also
available by mode of service delivery.
A comparison of STRI by regions and groups in Table 1 shows that the Middle
East and North Africa has the most restrictive services trade policies, followed by
South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa, with the last also
being the most heterogeneous cohort. As expected, OECD economies and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia not only report the lowest STRI values but also form
the most homogeneous cohorts. Significantly, the Asian regions are not only very
restrictive but also highly heterogeneous in terms of services trade impediments,
which again make Asia a relevant case study for the purposes of this enquiry.
A closer look at Table 1 provides an intuitive feel for the factors likely to make
economies potential candidates for negotiated regulatory convergence. For instance,
high levels of per capita income, economic development, and political stability all
likely contribute to the observed homogeneity in STRI among OECD economies
despite significant differences in language, culture, and distances within this cohort.
In the case of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, on the other hand, there is greater
homogeneity of language, culture, and distances, though more differences in terms
of per capita income and economic development. This suggests that a combination
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of these factors could determine which economies are potential candidates for
negotiated regulatory convergence.
IV. Empirical Methodology
Our empirical framework draws on McFadden’s (1975, 1976) qualitative
choice models where utility, here the (minimum or average) net gains for two
economies from participating in an STA, is modeled as a latent, unobservable
variable (y∗), which can be explained by a vector of explanatory variables (x). Since
y∗ cannot be observed, an indicator variable STA is used that takes the value 1
(indicating y∗ > 0) if two economies participate in a common STA and 0 (indicating
y∗ ≤ 0) otherwise.
More formally,
STA = 1 if y∗ > 0 and P(STA = 1) = P(y∗ > 0) = G(α + βxi j ) (1)
where P is the response probability associated with a trading dyad (ij) signing a
services accord,G(.) is a cumulative distribution function that ensures thatP(STAij =
1) lies in the unit interval, and xij is the vector of explanatory variables for a generic
economy pair.
Consistent with Baier and Bergstrand (2004), empirically (1) is estimated
by a probit model, assuming normality about the error term in the latent process.
Clearly, independent of the assumed cumulative distribution function, the nonlinear
nature of G(.) implies that the coefficient estimates only reveal the signs of the
partial effects of changes in xij on the probability of signing an STA. Thus, the
direction of the effect of variable xk on E(y∗ | x) = α + βx is only qualitatively (not
quantitatively) identical to the effect of xk on E(STA | x) = G(α + βx), where E(.)
denotes the expectation operator.
As a robustness check, however, we also estimate (1) using the linear
probability model (LPM).
V. Explanatory Variables
In their seminal work exploring the determinants of partners’ propensities to
negotiate bilateral trade agreements, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) documented that
distance, remoteness, size of the economy, and relative factor endowments were the
main economic determinants of goods trade agreement membership and that their
impact on empirical membership probability was consistent with economic theory.
Following them, we use a largely overlapping set of determinants in our empirical
analyses.
For any dyad ij, we include DISTij, which is the log of bilateral distance
between i and j. Economy sizes are represented by SRGDPij, which is the sum of the
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logs of real GDP of economies i and j, and DRGDPij, which is the absolute value of
the difference between the logs of real GDP of both economies.
DKLij andDROWKLij determine the role of factor endowments in economies’
propensities to negotiate agreements. DKLij is the absolute value of the difference
between the logs of capital–labor ratios of economies i and j. Apart from DKLij,
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) suggest using SQDKLij—the squared value of
DKLij—in order to control for the likely nonlinear impact of DKLij on the net gains
from participating in a trade agreement. Moreover, to account for dependence of i
and j on each other, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) suggested including DROWKLij,
which is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the logs of
capital–labor ratios of economies i and j and those of the ROW.
Formally,
DROWKLi j = 1
2
⎡
⎢⎣
∣∣∣∣∣log
[∑N
k=1,k =i Kk∑N
k=1,k =i Lk
]
− log
(
Ki
Li
)∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣log
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)∣∣∣∣∣
]
Cultural determinants include having a common language (COMLANGij), being
a part of the same former colony (COLONYij), having a common colonizer
(COMCOLij), having common legal origins (COMLAWij), and being a part of the
same country in the past (SAMECTRYij). More importantly from the perspective
of this paper, we also control for the level of services regulation in the dyad
(SREGij, which is the sum of the logs of STRI of economies i and j) and regulatory
heterogeneity between partners by including the absolute value of the difference
between the logs of STRI of both economies (DREGij).
Finally, to examine the role of embedded supply chains in the region and
complementarities between goods and services trade, we include the log of average
merchandise trade between economies i and j (BTGij) as an additional explanatory
variable.
The testable propositions from Baier and Bergstrand (2004) are likely to be
similar for STA membership as well. Thus,
(i) economies are more likely to negotiate accords with geographically closer
economies, though the effect of distance is likely to be benign for services
traded over the internet;
(ii) similar and larger economies are also likely to gain more due to the
exploitation of economies of scale and the presence of greater varieties flowing
from deeper integration in services markets;
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(iii) the greater the difference in relative factor endowments between economies,
and the larger the intercontinental trade costs, the more trade creation there is
likely to be;
(iv) the greater the difference in relative factor endowments between potential
partners and the ROW, the more likely trade diversion becomes;
(v) dyads with common cultural factors and homogeneity in regulation are more
likely to enter into agreements as are partners with low initial barriers to
services trade; and
(vi) partners with high levels of existing bilateral trade in goods are also more
likely to negotiate STAs, not least because the intensity of such trade (and
the competitiveness of goods exporters) stands to be enhanced through a
negotiated lowering of services input costs.
In estimating Equation (1), we thus expect the coefficients of SRGDPij,DKLij,
SQDKLij, BTGij, and the cultural variables to be positive, while those of DISTij,
DRGDPij, DROWKLij, SREGij, and DREGij are expected to be negative.
VI. Data
Data on trade agreements are taken from the WTO’s Regional Trade
Agreements Information System database, where STA = 1 for agreements notified
under Article V of the GATS through August 2015 and 0 otherwise. With the
exception of the PRC, the STRI for all economies in our sample relates to 2008.
Since regulatory convergence is an objective of services preferentialism, to minimize
endogeneity in our estimation emanating from reverse causality we only consider
services accords that came into effect in 2008 or later.5 The STRI for the PRC
pertains to 2011. However, the PRC has only concluded one services accord to date
(with Pakistan) among our sample of Asian economies since January 2008, which
is unlikely to influence either its STRI considerably or this paper’s overall results.
The earliest STA involving at least one Asian partner (New
Zealand–Singapore) entered into effect on 1 January 2001. Since trade agreements
are typically phased in over multiyear transition periods and to control for potential
endogeneity in our estimation, our data on the time-varying independent variables
5Only two services agreements were negotiated between Asian economies prior to 2008: Japan–Malaysia
(2006) and Japan–Thailand (2007). Our sample size thus remains effectively the same even without these two
agreements.
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are averages for 1979–1981 and centered on 1980. The choice of this early year
is also likely to control for any domino effects that the earliest STAs may have
exerted on the recent wave of services preferentialism involving Asian economies.
As robustness checks, however, we also include data on the time-varying independent
variables averaged for 1989–1991 and 1999–2001 in separate regressions.6 The
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) gravity
dataset (Head, Mayer, and Ries 2010) provides geographic distances between capital
cities that are used to compute DISTij. Data on real GDP are taken from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators and these are used to calculate SRGDPij and
DRGDPij. We approximate the relative factor endowment ratios (Ki/Li) by using
data on real per capita income for two reasons: (i) using the perpetual inventory
method to estimate capital stocks as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) in earlier time
periods leads to an unjustifiable loss of observations, and (ii) real per capita incomes
are highly correlated with capital–labor ratios (Egger and Larch 2008; Bergstrand,
Egger, and Larch 2016). Data on real per capita income are also taken from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Data on common language and colonial antecedents are taken from the CEPII
gravity dataset (Head, Mayer, and Ries 2010), while data on legal origins were
compiled using La Porta et al. (1999). The World Bank’s STRI data (Borchert,
Gootiiz, and Mattoo 2012) are used to calculate SREGij and DREGij. Data used to
calculate BTGij were sourced from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database (UN Comtrade). To the extent possible, all trade data were also averaged
for 1979–1981, 1989–1991, and 1999–2001 to minimize fluctuations in recording
practices.7 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2.
VII. Results
The results from the LPM and probit estimation of Equation (1), assuming
exogenous unilateral STRI, are reported in Table 3. In the first two columns of
Table 3, the time-varying regressors are averaged for 1979–1981. In columns (3)
and (4), the time-varying regressors are averaged for 1989–1991, while in columns
(5) and (6), these are averaged for 1999–2001. Standard errors are clustered by
trading partner pair in all specifications.
Unfortunately, with data on time-varying regressors averaged for 1979–1981,
the small number of observations meant that the probit model was left with no
degrees of freedom to contend with. We thus focus on the LPM results reported in
6We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
7In some cases, the earliest available years were 1984–1986 (the PRC), 1998–2000 (Mongolia and Viet Nam),
and 2000–2002 (Cambodia).
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Std.
Variable Acronym Obs. Mean Dev. Min. Max.
Services Trade Agreement Membership
STA membership status between i and j in
2015 (end-August)
STAij 103 0.136 0.344 0.000 1.000
Unilateral Services Trade Restrictiveness
Log sum of STRI of i and j SREGij 103 7.165 0.554 5.757 8.165
Absolute difference in log STRI of i and j DREGij 103 0.464 0.358 0.013 1.568
Absolute and Relative Endowment and Trade Variables (avg 1979–1981)
Log sum of GDP of i and j SRGDPij 76 48.880 2.551 42.643 54.625
Absolute difference in log GDP of i and j DRGDPij 76 2.218 1.649 0.016 7.626
Absolute difference in log GDP per capita
of i and j
DKLij 76 1.431 1.184 0.004 4.734
Squared absolute difference in log GDP
per capita of i and j
SQDKLij 76 3.431 5.228 0.000 22.411
Absolute difference in log GDP per capita
of i plus j with the rest of the world
DROWKLij 76 2.135 0.618 0.513 3.355
Log average bilateral goods trade between
i and j
BTGij 68 16.477 2.793 8.375 22.587
Absolute and Relative Endowment and Trade Variables (avg 1989–1991)
Log sum of GDP of i and j SRGDPij 89 49.799 2.607 43.491 55.983
Absolute difference in log GDP of i and j DRGDPij 89 2.298 1.636 0.016 7.654
Absolute difference in log GDP per capita
of i and j
DKLij 89 1.473 1.271 0.005 4.917
Squared absolute difference in log GDP
per capita of i and j
SQDKLij 89 3.766 5.696 0.000 24.174
Absolute difference in log GDP per capita
of i plus j with the rest of the world
DROWKLij 89 2.093 0.563 0.519 3.110
Log average bilateral goods trade between
i and j
BTGij 83 17.656 2.630 9.628 23.442
Absolute and Relative Endowment and Trade Variables (avg 1999–2001)
Log sum of GDP of i and j SRGDPij 103 50.312 2.839 43.457 57.072
Absolute difference in log GDP of i and j DRGDPij 103 2.524 1.740 0.039 7.744
Absolute difference in log GDP per capita
of i and j
DKLij 103 1.459 1.274 0.016 4.761
Squared absolute difference in log GDP
per capita of i and j
SQDKLij 103 3.738 5.489 0.000 22.664
Absolute difference in log GDP per capita
of i plus j with the rest of the world
DROWKLij 103 2.026 0.518 0.581 3.068
Log average bilateral goods trade between
i and j
BTGij 103 17.920 3.375 8.922 24.404
Geographical and Cultural Distance
Log bilateral distance between i and j DISTij 103 7.952 0.543 6.284 8.834
Common legal system between i and j COMLAWij 103 0.291 0.457 0.000 1.000
Common language between i and j COMLANGij 103 0.087 0.284 0.000 1.000
Colonial relationship between i and j COLONYij 103 0.019 0.139 0.000 1.000
Common colonizer between i and j COMCOLij 103 0.107 0.310 0.000 1.000
Units i and j belonged to the same country SAMECTRYij 103 0.049 0.216 0.000 1.000
GDP = gross domestic product, STA = services trade agreement, STRI = Services Trade Restrictiveness Index.
Sources: World Trade Organization. Regional Trade Agreements Information System. http://rtais.wto.org/UI/
PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx; Borchert, Gootiiz, and Mattoo 2012; World Bank. World Development Indicators.
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators; United Nations. UN Commodity Trade
Statistics Database. http://comtrade.un.org/; Head, Mayer, and Ries 2010; La Porta et al. 1999.
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Table 3. Explaining STA Membership within Asia, Assuming Exogenous Unilateral STRI
Dependent Variable: STA Membership
Time-Varying (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressors LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit
Averaged Over 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001
DISTij −0.020 11.016 0.028 1.143 0.096 2.016∗∗
(0.106) . (0.080) (0.863) (0.068) (0.774)
SRGDPij −0.029 7.157 −0.013 −0.872 −0.005 −0.687#
(0.036) . (0.031) (0.715) (0.033) (0.358)
DRGDPij −0.053 −1.768 −0.039 −0.012 −0.047∗ −0.059
(0.039) (0.000) (0.029) (0.213) (0.019) (0.158)
DKLij 0.216 −5.482 0.103 −0.909 0.138# 0.864
(0.145) (0.000) (0.124) (1.593) (0.073) (0.943)
SQDKLij −0.038 0.338 −0.014 0.190 −0.014 −0.119
(0.030) . (0.029) (0.278) (0.021) (0.252)
DROWKLij −0.057 −16.825 −0.012 −0.138 0.060 0.802
(0.101) (0.000) (0.090) (1.415) (0.077) (0.650)
BTGij 0.088∗∗ −1.260 0.057# 1.563∗ 0.050∗ 1.153∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.000) (0.031) (0.618) (0.023) (0.303)
SREGij 0.098 −0.382 −0.004 0.139 −0.064 −1.023
(0.101) (0.000) (0.132) (1.023) (0.092) (0.658)
DREGij 0.818∗∗∗ 13.760 0.599∗∗∗ 5.374∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗ 2.083∗
(0.120) . (0.164) (1.470) (0.112) (0.909)
COMLAWij 0.027 7.907 0.008 −4.494∗∗∗ 0.005 −4.019∗∗∗
(0.121) . (0.076) (0.787) (0.046) (1.193)
COMLANGij −0.044 −2.255 −0.042 0.062 0.004 0.026
(0.112) (0.000) (0.106) (0.610) (0.114) (0.639)
COLONYij −0.211 . −0.254 . −0.104 .
(0.263) . (0.224) . (0.174) .
COMCOLij 0.062 15.294 0.116 5.190∗∗∗ 0.169 5.394∗∗∗
(0.143) . (0.147) (1.278) (0.129) (1.184)
SAMECTRYij −0.238 . −0.349∗ . −0.288# .
(0.189) . (0.171) . (0.154) .
Constant −0.764 −397.235 −0.601 2.037 −1.097 −0.750
(1.795) (0.000) (1.461) (20.402) (1.091) (11.329)
N 55 51 78 72 103 96
df_m 13 0 14 12 14 12
r2 0.683 0.457 0.403
Explanatory power 0.8264 0.6757 0.6757 0.553 0.6346 0.5081
Number of predictions 16 22 32
at which
P(STAij = 1) < 0
Correct predictions (%)
overall 94.2 95.1
for STA = 1 64.3 85.7
for STA = 0 98.9 96.6
LPM = linear probability model, STA = services trade agreement, STRI = Services Trade Restrictiveness Index.
Notes: # = 10% level of significance, ∗ = 5% level of significance, ∗∗ = 1% level of significance, ∗∗∗ = 0.1% level
of significance. Standard errors, clustered by trading partner pair, are reported in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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column (1), which suggest that only BTGij and DREGij were statistically significant
determinants of STA membership in Asia for the earliest time period (1979–1981).
Moreover, while the coefficient of BTGij is positive as predicted, that of DREGij is
also positive, which runs counter to our predictions. The latter suggests that Asian
trading partners with divergent regulatory frameworks may in fact be negotiating
services accords to foster regulatory convergence. The explanatory power of the
LPM was also found to be high at 0.8264.
The results from the LPM with data on time-varying explanatory variables
averaged for 1989–1991 and reported in column (3) were qualitatively similar to
those reported in column (1), though the positive coefficient of BTGij was now found
to be weakly significant. Moreover, being a part of the same economy in the past
seemed to have a negative impact on the propensity to negotiate services accords in
Asia.
The probit results reported in column (4) provided evidence for the positive
role of BTGij, DREGij, and having a common colonizer (COMCOLij), but provided
evidence for the negative role of a common legal system (COMLAWij) in determining
STA membership in Asia. Significantly, the probit model correctly predicted STA
membership for 94.2% of the observations in our sample.8 Of the total, 14 dyads
actually negotiated an STA and nine of these were correctly predicted by our model.
The remaining 89 dyads did not have a services accord and our model correctly
predicted 88 (98.9%) of these.
With data on time-varying regressors averaged for 1999–2001, more
explanatory variables exhibit statistical significance in the LPM and probit results
reported in columns (5) and (6), respectively, but some of these results are also more
counterintuitive. For instance, the coefficient of DISTij is positive (thus negating the
role of geography in the choice of STA partners within Asia) and that of SRGDPij
is negative (thus negating the role of the size of potential markets) in the probit
results in column (6), both of which run counter to theoretical predictions in Baier
and Bergstrand (2004). Given that the underlying data on time-varying regressors
has been averaged for 1999–2001 in these results, potential endogeneity in the
estimation cannot be ruled out.
We thus focus on the results reported in columns (1) through (4) to explain
STA membership in Asia and these results suggest that trading partner pairs with
greater historical levels of bilateral merchandise trade and wider differences in
their services regulatory frameworks are more likely candidates for STA formation
in Asia. Thus, the servicification hypothesis appears to command the strongest
empirical appeal in explaining our sample economies’ propensities to sign services
accords.
8To enable this comparison, we used the decision-rule from Baier and Bergstrand (2004). If STApredi j > 0.5,
then we take this value to be 1. If STApredi j < = 0, then we take this value to be 0.
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A. Endogenous Unilateral STRI
In this subsection, we relax the assumption of the exogeneity of the services
regulatory frameworks.
The main objective of STAs is to increase trade in services between partners.
Reducing levels of restrictive regulation and promoting regulatory convergence are
important channels through which services accords expand services trade volumes.
Thus, the determinants of an economy’s choice to negotiate a services accord are
likely to be indistinguishable from those that inform whether certain economies are
more likely candidates for a reduction in restrictive regulation levels as well as for
regulatory convergence.
To examine this secondary hypothesis, in distinct regressions, we explain the
restrictiveness of services regimes in a dyad and regulatory heterogeneity between
partners using the same set of controls as used for explaining STA membership in
Equation (1).
Formally,
DREGi j = θ + πxi j + εi j (2)
where DREGij is the absolute value of the difference between the logs of the STRI
of two economies and εij is the error term.
Moreover,
SREGi j = μ + ηxi j + ξi j (3)
where SREGij is the sum of the log levels of STRI of two economies and ξ ij is the
error term.
We then use the predicted values of DREGij and SREGij from Equations (2)
and (3), respectively, as additional control variables in Equation (1). The statistically
significant coefficients of DREGpredi j and SREG
pred
i j suggest that these variables
were endogenous in explaining STA membership, thereby validating our secondary
hypothesis. Equations (2) and (3) were estimated using ordinary least squares but
these results are not reported.
The results from the LPM and probit estimation of Equation (1), testing
for the endogenous treatment of STRI, are reported in Table 4. Once again, the
time-varying regressors are averaged for 1979–1981 in the first two columns of
Table 4. In columns (3) and (4), the time-varying regressors are averaged for
1989–1991, while in columns (5) and (6), these are averaged for 1999–2001.
Standard errors are clustered by trading partner pair in all specifications.
While the overall results from these regressions are qualitatively similar
to those reported in Table 3, the coefficient of DREGpredi j is omitted and that of
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Table 4. Explaining STA Membership within Asia, Allowing for Endogenous Unilateral
STRI
Dependent Variable: STA Membership
Time-Varying (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressors LPM Probit LPM Probit LPM Probit
Averaged Over 1979–1981 1989–1991 1999–2001
DISTij 0.007 11.016 0.051 1.143 0.106# 2.016∗∗
(0.102) . (0.078) (0.863) (0.061) (0.774)
SRGDPij −0.041 7.157 −0.021 −0.872 −0.008 −0.687#
(0.028) . (0.030) (0.715) (0.030) (0.358)
DRGDPij −0.034 −1.768 −0.022 −0.012 −0.041# −0.059
(0.050) (0.000) (0.032) (0.213) (0.021) (0.158)
DKLij 0.219 −5.482 0.106 −0.909 0.144# 0.864
(0.145) (0.000) (0.123) (1.593) (0.074) (0.943)
SQDKLij −0.035 0.338 −0.010 0.190 −0.013 −0.119
(0.030) . (0.029) (0.278) (0.020) (0.252)
DROWKLij −0.106 −16.825 −0.051 −0.138 0.039 0.802
(0.138) (0.000) (0.093) (1.415) (0.080) (0.650)
BTGij 0.089∗∗ −1.260 0.058# 1.563∗ 0.044# 1.153∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.000) (0.031) (0.618) (0.026) (0.303)
SREGij 0.262 −0.382 0.199# 0.139 0.010 −1.023
(0.191) (0.000) (0.111) (1.023) (0.076) (0.658)
DREGij 0.818∗∗∗ 13.760 0.599∗∗∗ 5.374∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗ 2.083∗
(0.120) . (0.164) (1.470) (0.112) (0.909)
COMLAWij 0.009 7.907 −0.025 −4.494∗∗∗ −0.006 −4.019∗∗∗
(0.115) . (0.075) (0.787) (0.049) (1.193)
COMLANGij −0.044 −2.255 −0.065 0.062 −0.008 0.026
(0.112) (0.000) (0.108) (0.610) (0.118) (0.639)
COLONYij . . . . . .
COMCOLij 0.063 15.294 0.110 5.190∗∗∗ 0.156 5.394∗∗∗
(0.143) . (0.148) (1.278) (0.129) (1.184)
SAMECTRYij −0.159 . −0.246 . −0.231 .
(0.203) . (0.155) . (0.141) .
DREGpredi j . . . . . .
SREGpredi j −0.165 . −0.203 . −0.074 .
(0.205) . (0.179) . (0.124) .
Constant −1.539 −397.235 −1.852 2.037 −1.450 −0.750
(2.240) (0.000) (1.526) (20.402) (1.287) (11.329)
N 55 51 78 72 103 96
df_m 13 0 14 12 14 12
r2 0.683 0.457 0.403
Explanatory power 0.8264 0.6757 0.6757 0.553 0.6346 0.5081
Number of predictions 17 22 32
at which
P(STAij = 1) < 0
Test for SREGpred = 0 0.4247 0.2606 0.5514
(p-value)
LPM = linear probability model, STA = services trade agreement, STRI = Services Trade Restrictiveness Index.
Notes: # = 10% level of significance, ∗ = 5% level of significance, ∗∗ = 1% level of significance, ∗∗∗ = 0.1% level
of significance. Standard errors, clustered by trading partner pair, are reported in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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SREGpredi j is statistically indifferent from 0, thereby pointing to the validity of
the exogenous treatment of the services regulatory frameworks in our baseline
estimations of Equation (1). This is also confirmed by the p-values of the parameter
tests reported at the bottom of Table 4.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the question of whether certain economies within Asia
are more likely candidates for negotiated regulatory convergence and harmonization
in the context of services agreements. The two papers closest to the analysis on
offer in this paper are Baier and Bergstrand (2004), who were the first to ask this
question from the perspective of agreements focusing on goods trade, and Cole and
Guillin (2015), who first explored the issue for services accords without, however,
considering the influence of regulation in services trade.
While our results may be Asia-specific, the goodness-of-fit of our empirical
model, demonstrated by the probabilities that were predicted successfully, is in
line with the results found in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and improves on those
found in Cole and Guillin (2015). Our results suggest that Asian economies with
high preexisting levels of bilateral goods trade and divergent services regulatory
frameworks are more likely to negotiate services agreements with each other.
A number of policy implications can be derived from the above results.
For starters, far from inhibiting the quest for deeper market integration, ex ante
divergences in regulatory regimes and enforcement capacities may well prove a
significant spur to negotiated convergence, allowing parties to import best trade- and
investment-facilitating standards from partners with greater overall regulatory
efficiency. Where regulatory divergences are so marked as to inhibit market
integration, the supply of adequate doses of variable geometry in meeting otherwise
common policy objectives may represent a useful means to promote convergence.
A case in point is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations where, despite
far-reaching income and development gaps within the regional grouping, significant
regulatory convergence has been achieved through formulas that internalize the need
for differentiated implementation modalities across members.
Among economic variables, the positive and significant relationship found
between past bilateral trade flows and STA membership in Asia clearly stands out.
This may lend support to the idea that binding agreements in the area of services are
increasingly perceived by governments as important instruments to complement
goods trade. This has particular resonance in Asia given the growing role of
the region in supply chain production. Producer services (e.g., transportation and
logistics, telecommunications, finance, business and professional services) play a
significant role in goods-dominated supply chains, and legally binding commitments
in treaty instruments (governing both trade and investment) assume heightened value
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as they provide a degree of predictability and stability that is essential for the proper
functioning of complex cross-border operations (Baldwin and Kawai 2013, Baldwin
and Lopez-Gonzalez 2013).
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